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ABSTRACT
Theodore Dreiser espoused in Sister Carrie a
mechanistic or deterministic model for the operations of all
the world, including human behavior.
Nothing, he believed,
was exempt from causality.
He was heavily influenced in
this belief by Herbert Spencer's metaphysical treatise First
Principles. The aim of this thesis is to illuminate the
influence of Spencer's work on Dreiser, to suggest how that
influence helped Dreiser shape the plot of his novel, with
particular reference to the mechanistic ethic for which it
becomes almost a parable, a cautionary tale, and to show how
Dreiser incorporates psychological verisimilitude into the
novel to such an extent that he anticipates the efforts of
modern clinical and ethical thinkers in the attempt to
resolve the question:
if man is not free, is he not fated
to do as he pleases?

It is rare that any one book can be said to have been
influenced by any other to the extent that Sister Carrie was
influenced by Herbert Spencer's First Principles, a meta
physical treatise which proposes a wholly mechanistic or
materialistic model for the world.

The narrator of Sister

Carrie refers specifically to Spencer's work, oddly enough
in the form of a caveat;
For all the liberal analysis of Spencer and
our modern naturalistic philosophers we have an
infantile perception of morals.
There is more to
the subject than mere conformity to a law of
evolution.
It is yet peeper than conformity to
things of earth alone.
Nonetheless, Dreiser goes on to make use of Spencer's
theories, and indeed places Carrie in a world in which the
material and mechanical are so heavily emphasized as to
obscure any glimpse of anything not "of earth alone."
Christopher Katope, in what is probably the most
thorough discussion of Spencer and Sister Carrie to date,
writes that First Principles provided Dreiser with an
"architechtonic element" for the novel and "helped him solve
the problems of character relationships and plot advancement."
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evolution

Katope views the novel as an illustration of
(as Spencer describes it), the narrative, the

description and characterization fleshing out a skeleton of
theory.

He takes as a point of departure for this view,

Spencer's model of evolution:
Evolution is an integration of matter and
concomitant dissipation of motion; during which
the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity to a definite coherent
heterogeneity. . . .
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Thus, Katope traces Carrie's progression from "indefiniteness," indecision, confusion of "her own image of herself
and the world's," into an artist of "differentiated,
self-assured complexity."
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The novel depicts Carrie's

transformation from one of a class, just another shop girl,
to "one of a kind," a celebrity who can trade on her unique
identity.

Simultaneously, Hurstwood's dissolution is shown,

taking him from "coherent heterogeneity" to "incoherent
homogeneity."

From his position as Manager,

"a well-known

man about town," with a "solid substantial air,"

(SC, p. 43)

whose vocation consists mainly of lending his own character
to the atmosphere of the establishment, he degenerates to
just another of the countless, nameless beggars in New York,
wandering the streets, muttering "incoherently," unable to
"think logically."

(SC, p. 494)

Katope goes on to argue

that Dreiser sends Carrie and Hurstwood on their various
perambulations through the city to illustrate the "dissipa
tion of motion" which accompanies an organism's evolutionary
development.
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He also suggests that Carrie's rocking chair

is introduced at various points as a "rhythmic prop" to
suggest the "new order of rhythm" which, in Spencer's view,
accompanies all evolution.^

These last two points, it

should be noted, are not made very convincingly.

The

language with which Dreiser describes the activities,
walking and rocking, is in no way evocative of Spencer,
though elsewhere there are numerous deliberate echoes of the
philosopher.

In the absence of any auctorial pronouncement
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on the subject, therefore, the case for a deliberate parallel
here seems tenuous, at best.

Finally, Katope raises and too

quickly drops the Spencerian concept of "equilibration,"
noting only that as the novel opens, Hurstwood is in a state
of "equilibrium," his wants more or less matched by his
means.
In much of this Katope is correct, but Spencer's
philosophy was much more to Dreiser than a skeleton for a
plot or a blueprint of the actions of his characters.
Katope fails to recognize the complete logical agreement
which Dreiser holds with Spencer.

If Dreiser's view is

anywhere at variance with the philosopher's, it is nowhere
evidenced save in the caveat above.

Moreover, Katope almost

ignores the concept of equilibration, the very concept most
fundamental to Sister Carrie.

Equilibration is, in this

novel, the concept which dictated the moral slant, which, in
the words of Ronald Martin, provided "conceptual alternatives
to conventional morality."
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Equilibration is also one of the concepts most funda
mental to First Principles, one of the most basic blocks on
which the work's argument is founded.

The concept of

equilibration arises because, to paraphrase Spencer, we
necessarily conceive of our own

(ultimately ineluctable)

world as consisting of coexistent opposing forces, such as
"attraction and repulsion" or "pressure and tension."
p. 192)

Given this, it follows that,

In all cases there is a progress toward
equilibration.
That universal coexistence of

(FP,

4

antagonist forces which, as we before saw, neces
sitates the universality of rhythm, and which, as
we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of
every force into divergent forces, at the same
time necessitates the ultimate establishment of
balance.
(FP, p. 419)
Clearly, Dreiser took formulations such as this to
heart for he constructed in Sister Carrie a system of forces
and elements in varying states of equilibrium.

The notions

of balance and imbalance are all-pervasive, referred to
specifically

in philosophical asides, expressed in symbol

and embodied

in the structure of the narrative.

Among the most specific references to balance is
Dreiser’s reflection on the human condition as a "balance
between good and evil" and what seems to be his description
of human happiness:
There is nothing in this world more delightful
than that middle state in which we mentally
balance at times, possessed of means, lured by
desire, and yet deterred by conscience or want of
decision.
(SC, p. 67)
Consistent with this view of human nature, Sister
Carrie portrays characters struggling for balance and
security against a tide of forces which drags all toward an
entropic equilibrium.

In the character rendered most

subjectively we find the clearest example of this, as
Hurstwood's progress is pictured in terms of a system of
balances and imbalances, showing the operation of the
equilibrating forces in the world.

At the beginning of the

novel Hurstwood is in a position of relative harmony with
the world.

Managing the bar provides him a nice balance of

desires and means.

He is content in his career.

But, as

5

Katope points out, Hurstwood's equilibrium is an "unstable"
one.
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The materialism of his wife and children threatens to

overtake his means.

Furthermore, his acrimonious relation

ship with his wife and his estrangement from his children
have caused him to live too much for his work.

As domestic

harmony degenerates, Hurstwood looks for compensation
elsewhere:

"...

his interest in Drouet's little shop girl

grew in an almost evenly balanced proportion."

(SC, p. 115)

Normally, the tendency toward balance deters Hurstwood:
Once in a while he would meet a woman whose youth,
sprightliness and humor would make his wife seem
deficient by contrast, but the temporary dissatis
faction which such an encounter might arouse would
be counterbalanced by his social position and a
certain matter of policy.
(SC, p. 85)
Hurstwood's domestic difficulties, however, are exacerbated
to a point which suppresses any discretion or indecision
which might restrain him.

Then, when his indiscretions come

to light and he forfeits his home life entirely, Hurstwood
becomes desperate.

He steals money from his employers and

steals Carrie from Drouet in an attempt to restore balance
and contentment.
York.

He succeeds,

in the short term, in New

His status there erodes with respect to the outside

world, but this does not threaten his contentment at first,
for he does not fully sense this erosion.

"If he did not,

it was due to the fact that his state was so well-balanced
that an absolute change for the worse did not show."
p. 339)

(SC,

Thus, even if his professional status is reduced,

his satisfaction with his youthful "wife" compensates for
this fact.
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Hurstwood's contentment cannot last long, because here,
too, his equilibrium is unstable.

Hurstwood is analogous to

what Spencer calls an equilibrium mobile, a closed system of
elements in equilibrium which is yet subject to the larger
equilibrating forces of the world around it.

Spencer

illustrates with the example of a top, the gyroscopic
equilibrium of which persists only until gravity and friction
make their claims upon it.

(FP, p. 240)

Because, as Ernest Griffin puts it, Dreiser's "plots
and characters gather significance when related to studies"
of more modern thinkers

(he has the existentialist Norman O.

Brown and Herbert Marcuse in m i nd), it might be useful here
to turn to the work of several theorists whose work suggests
the psychological verisimilitude with which Dreiser, drawing
from Spencer, imbues Sister Carrie.^

Some contemporary

psychologists examining, much as the way Dreiser has done,
the full range of sacrifices and rewards, both economic and
intangible, in social and intimate transactions, have
concluded that there is a natural drive to balance expendi
ture and gain.
"equity theory."
this:

This, loosely stated, is what they call
The central tenet of equity theory is

"When individuals find themselves participating in

inequitable relationships, they will become distressed.

The

more inequitable the relationship, the more distress the
individuals will f e e l . " ^

On the most intimate and

intangible level, Dreiser depicts the inequity of love, the
disparity of feeling and commitment between Hurstwood and
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Carrie; Carrie does not entirely reciprocate Hurstwood's
affection.

Another theorist, Merleau-Ponty, describes the

probable result of such an imbalance:
This is what happens in the case where there
is more love felt on one side than on the other:
one throws himself, and his whole life, into his
love, the other remains free, finding in this love
a merely contingent manner of living.
The former
feels his being and substance flowing away into
that f r e e d o m ^ h i c h confronts him, whole and
unqualified.
Clearly, this is what has happened with Hurstwood and
Carrie.

She is not in love with him in Chicago, though his

influence is sufficient "almost to delude her into the
belief that she was possessed of a lively passion for him."
(SC, p. 205)

Carrie finds in their attachment only a

"contingent manner of existence," in fact assents to it only
as such.

Hurstwood, begging her to come with him, promises,

"You can see Montreal and New York, and then, if you don't
want to stay you can go back."

Under these terms, for the

first time, Carrie finds the arrangement remotely acceptable.
The first gleam of fairness shown in this
proposition for Carrie.
It seemed a plausible
thing to do, much as she feared opposition if she
tried to carry it out.
Montreal and New York.
Even now she was speeding toward those strange
lands and she could see them if she liked.
She
thought, but made no sign.
(SC, p. 279)
Carrie acquiesces in the proposition, but demands the
freedom to leave if she wants to.
later broods over what he has lost:

(SC, p. 280)

Hurstwood

"his host of friends,

his name, his house and family . . . his dignity, his merry
meetings, his pleasant evenings," feeling (as Merleau-Ponty
might characterize it) his "being and substance flowing
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away."

(SC, p. 287)

Hurstwood's "substance" passes, in a

sense, into that 'whole and unqualified freedom' which
Carrie comes to possess, because Carrie will gain from the
relationship a form of that which Hurstwood sacrifices for
her, celebrity and flexibility within cosmopolitan society.
Established in New York, Hurstwood experiences a period
of contentment, but only because he ignores the erosion of
domestic tranquility which the disparity of feeling makes
inevitable.
At any moment the extremes of feeling might be
anti-polarized at the dinner table.
This often
happens in the best regulated families.
Little
things brought out on such occasions need great
love to obliterate them afterward. . . . Between
Hurstwood and Carrie, as we have shown, was no
mutual great love.
Dreiser finds in the action of the equilibrating forces on
man the seed of destruction of Hurstwood's temporary
contentment:
Either (man) is growing stronger, healthier,
wiser as the youth approaching manhood, or he is
growing weaker, older and less incisive mentally,
as the man approaching old age.
There are no
other states.
Frequently, there is a period
between the cessation of youthful accretion and
the setting in, in the case of the middle-aged
man, of the tendency toward decay when the two
processes are almost perfectly balanced and there
is little doing in either direction.
Given time
enough, however, the balance becomes a sagging to
the grave side.
(SC, p. 338)
In this passage we find a clear echo of Spencer's model of
evolution, and Dreiser's mentor sheds some light on the
course of Hurstwood's decline:
. . . the aggregate has at length parted with
its excess of motion, and habitually receives as
much from its environment as it habitually
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loses— when it has reached that equilibrium in
which its changes end, it thereafter remains
subject to all actions in its environment which
may increase the quantity of motion it contains,
and which in the lapse of time are sure, either
slowly or suddenly to give its parts such excess
of motion as will cause disintegration.
Accordingly, as its equilibrium is a very stable
or unstable one, its dissolution may come quickly
or may be indefinitely delayed. . . . (FP, p. 448)
Hurstwood's equilibrium is an unstable one, for his rela
tionship to Carrie is unbalanced.

Furthermore, his fortunes

are due to decline, he no longer will 'receive as much as he
habitually loses,' and this imbalance will hasten his
disintegration.

Dreiser posits yet another cause of disin

tegration, Hurstwood's own morbid perception of disparity.
Constant comparison between his old state and his
new showed a balance for the worse, which produced
a constant state of gloom, or at least depression.
Now it has been shown experimentally that a
constantly subdued frame of mind produces certain
poisons in the blood, called katastates, just as
virtuous feelings or pleasure and delight produce
helpful chemicals called anastates.
The poisons,
generated by remorse, inveigh against the system
and eventually produce marked physical deterio
ration.
To this Hurstwood was subject.
(SC,
p. 339)
Clearly, Dreiser intends to show Hurstwood undone by
the many imbalances which arise in his world.

Just as a

plenist universe abhors a vacuum, Dreiser's equilibrating
universe abhors imbalance and Hurstwood is swept away by the
forces the world marshals to eliminate it.
The notion of balance pertains to far more than
Hurstwood's fate.

Dreiser has structured the novel in such

a way as to suggest that he was trying to balance the
elements of the novel itself.

He loads Sister Carrie with
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terms suggesting opposites and correlatives, reinforcing the
sense of the world as a system of polarities struggling to
strike a balance.

Thus, he creates in Carrie "the passivity

of soul which is always the mirror of the active world."
(SC, p. 157)
nature.

He contrasts the "emotional" and "intellectual"

(SC, p. 378)

He speaks of "the ancient attraction

of the stale to the fresh."

(SC, p. 105)

the motors of human activity,
(SC, p. 73)

Dreiser posits as

"free-will" and "instinct."

The need for balance dictates the operation, in

the novel of a physical law, formulated in Spencer's work,
"action and reaction are equal and opposite."

(FP, p. 462)

Thus, Dreiser writes of Hurstwood's epistolary wooing of
Carrie,

"By the natural law which governs all effort, what

he wrote reacted upon him."

(SC, p. 144)

Possibly he has

this principle in mind, too, when he has the critic state,
"If you wish to be merry, see Carrie's frown."

(SC, p. 448)

Dreiser suggests an equal and opposite reaction when he
writes of Carrie,

"So peculiar was her lonely, self-

withdrawing temper, that she was becoming an interesting
figure in the public eye."
as well)

(SC, p. 478)

Carrie

(and Ames

seem to attract attention almost to the extent that

they shun it.
Dreiser gives many elements in the novel their opposite
number to insure a suggestion of balance in the structure.
The largest system of opposites occurs within the corres
ponding ascent of Carrie and fall of Hurstwood.

The two

characters very nearly trade positions, as is made clear by
%
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considering their respective positions at the beginning and
end of the novel.

At the outset Carrie is a nearly helpless

waif apparently destined to end in the street, and Hurstwood
is a man of position and localized celebrity.

As the novel

ends, Carrie has lifted herself above the faceless masses,
has fashioned an identity for herself, has become a
"personality," as is highly proclaimed to New York in the
glowing signs.

(SC, p. 493)

At the opposite pole is

Hurstwood; he has been assimilated into the nobodies.

So

complete is his transformation that he becomes, in a sense,
the beggar he ignores as theater-goer in Chicago

(p. 139),

begging in front of the New York theaters for something to
eat and the price of a bed.

(SC, p. 492)

The 1900,

"unexpurgated" edition of Sister Carrie suggests this
metamorphosis somewhat more strongly, with a clearer echo of
the beggar by Hurstwood.

Here the beggar pleads,

"Say

mister . . . , would you mind giving me the price of a bed?"
and "Honest to God, mister, I'm without a place to sleep."
(p. 103)

Hurstwood later says,

will you, mister?

"Give me a little something,

. . . For god's sake, do; I'm starving."
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Thus, the progress to opposite ends of the spectrum is
completed, as Carrie's name lights up the sky Hurstwood
snuffs his light and the city sends his "nameless body to
Potter's field.
Consistent with the importance of balance in the novel
the action is structured to suggest a device of counter
weights.

We see the fortunes of Hurstwood descend to

counterbalance the ascent of Carrie, and we can mark the
strata through which they pass.

The first stop on Hurstwood

fall is the point at which he begins to measure himself
against Drouet.

Hurstwood " . . .

looked at the well-dressed,

envied him, and now as he

jolly salesman whom he so much

liked, the cold gleam of the rival glowed in his eye."
p. 108)

(SC,

Inherent in this rivalry is an equation of indi

viduals, and this is a reduction in stature for Hurstwood
who should be superior to Drouet.

At the same time, Carrie

is said to have come up a bit in the world;

"...

when

Hurstwood called he found a young woman who was much more
than the Carrie Drouet had first spoken to."

(SC, p. 105)

On the train to Detroit Hurstwood's reduction is more
complete and he plays the part of the "masher," offering a
"berth in the sleeper," and the use of his coat.
p. 281)

(SC,

Carrie's superiority to Hurstwood at this point is

clearly established by his abject prostration before her.
Carrie's rise to success in the theater is, at least in
its beginning, necessitated by Hurstwood's continued decline
Unemployed, he finds himself in New York every bit as
dependent upon her as she had once been on Drouet.

In a

continuance of the role-reversing trend of the action,
Hurstwood's dependence on Carrie ceases with the symbolic
repayment of the exact sum with which Carrie's dependence
upon Drouet began.

(SC, p. 439)

Continuing the trend,

Hurstwood is shown at one point in the straits in which
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Carrie begins the novel, one social rung above the street,
with employ so tenuous as to be lost through illness.
p. 463)

Hurstwood,

(SC,

like Carrie, does lose his job through

illness, but, on the "graveward" side of the continuum,
there is no one to rescue him from the gutter.
Dreiser uses, in his counterweighted structure, the
image of counterweighted devices at several key junctures.
Minnie Hanson, in her dreams,

sees her sister descending

merrily to perdition in some sort of line-and-pulley device,
"An old basket used for descending was hanging there,
fastened by an old rope.

. . . She began to pull the basket

over, and now in spite of all protest she had swung over and
was going down— down."

(SC/ p. 79)

Later, when the twinned

fortunes of Carrie and Hurstwood are in a state of temporary
equilibrium, Carrie comes face to face with the cosmopolitan
society

(in the person of Mrs. Vance)

for which she is

destined, through a stationary dumbwaiter.

(SC, p. 318)

Carrie finally reverses her descent into perdition, in the
person of Drouet, in her New York hotel, taking the elevator
up, out of the reach of the salesman.

(SC, p. 476)

Thus,

Dreiser manages to include as symbol a signature and
suggestion of the structure of the whole novel.
The preoccupation with notions of equilibration and
balance in Sister Carrie is more than a structural or an
"architectonic" device.
emphasis of the novel.

It leads to the considerable moral
It seems rather ironic that this

particular novel was once regarded as immoral or amoral,

for
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the moral tone of Sister Carrie falls just short of
didacticism.

What Dreiser seems to have attempted is to

start with certain metaphysical or meta-ethical principles
(principles such as laws of nature or of the universe more
fundamental than ethics, but out of which ethics necessarily
come), and then to depict the operation of those principles,
and the true ethic which arises from them, in the novel.

In

the process Dreiser mounts an attack on conventional morals
or ethics.
Almost immediately, Sister Carrie seems to have drawn
the righteous indignation of those with very conventional
moral sensibilities.

There are accounts detailing the

objections of either Frank Doubleday, the novel's eventual
publisher, or those of his wife, on moral grounds, and the
near suppression of the novel on those grounds.

15

While

hardly typical of the reviews, the following contemporary
review of Sister Carrie, catches the essence of the
moralistic objections to that work:
"Sister Carrie," by Theodore Dreiser.
The author
calls his work a novel of city life, but he might
have been more descriptive had he called it a
novel of the worst side of city life. . . .
The book is unhealthful in tone, however, and its
literary quality^is not high enough to cover its
faults of theme.
The book is flawed, in this reviewer's eyes and apparently
for the Doubledays, by its lack of overtly moral theme, by
the fact that neither Carrie nor Drouet are punished for
their adulteries.

As his diaries and biographies attest,

Dreiser's sexual mores were unconventional for the time, and
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this is reflected in his work, but Sister Carrie is by no
means amoral.
Dreiser, along with Spencer, holds that the same laws
which describe the operation of natural phenomena describe
the motivations and behavior of men as well.
man being borne along by the forces of nature,

Dreiser sees
"Among the

forces which sweep and play through the universe, untutored
man is but a wisp in the wind."

(SC/ P* 73)

Man is subject

to the tyranny of his own chemistry and instinct, but
Dreiser's view of the world does not preclude free will.
We see man far removed out of the lairs of the
jungles, his innate instincts dulled by too near
an approach to free will, his free will scarcely
sufficiently developed to replace his instincts
and afford him perfect guidance.
(SC, p. 73)
What Dreiser means by free will, however, is not the conven
tional notion of the concept.

Some years after writing

Sister Carrie, in his philosophical writings, Dreiser
ridiculed what sounds like the Victorian notion of free
will:
But assume that the battery, finding itself to be
a battery, (although, as in the case of man, not
knowing just how or w h y ) , exclaims to itself— By
God! I made that bell ring! . . . Yet man says to
himself— See, I am a man, I am^iyaking my way in
life.
I am master of my fate.
Dreiser ridicules philosophically naive notions of free
will, particularly those which require free will and deny
causation to support their view of the operation of ethical
principles.

Dreiser would surely have encountered some

version of one such system of thought in his Catholic
catechism, an echo of which, the theological "problem of
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evil," we find him mocking in An American Tragedy.
For in some blind, dualistic way both she and Asa
[Clyde Griffiths* parents] insisted, as do all
religionists, in disassociating God from harm and
error and misery, while granting him nevertheless
supreme control.
They would seek for something
else— some malign, treacherous, deceiving power
which, in the face of God's omniscience and
omnipotence, still beguiles and betrays— and find
it eventually in the error and perverseness of the
human heart, which-god has made, yet which he does
not control. . . .
Dreiser, in a letter to H. L. Mencken, makes Spencer at
least partly responsible for the philosophical demise of his
religious beliefs.

"(Spencer, Huxley and Tyndall)

shifted

my point of view tremendously, confirmed my worst suspicions
and destroyed the last remaining traces of Catholicism which
I now detest as a political organization or otherwise."

19

Apparently, Dreiser does not wish to divorce any class
of phenomena entirely from the material laws, or from the
fact of causation.

He has taken his cue from First

Principles where Spencer specifically includes action of the
mind, heart or soul, in his discussion of physical phenomena:
In what we distinguish as acquired habits, and in
the moral differences of races and nations produced
by habits that are maintained through successive
generations, we have countless illustrations of
this progressive adaptation; which can cease only
with the establishment of a complete equilibrium
between constitutions and conditions.
Possibly some will fail to see how the equilibra
tions described in this section can be classed
with those preceding them. . . . Nevertheless,
such equilibrations are as truly physical as the
rest. . . . For the present it must suffice to
point out, as before, that what we know subjec
tively as states of consciousness are, objectively,
modes of force. . . . (FP, p. 438)
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Clearly, Dreiser holds with Spencer here.

We have the

evidence of his discussion of katastates and anastates to
attest to the fact that Dreiser did not divorce subjective
and physical phenomena.

Also, in his accounting for

Carrie's lack of conscience, as she goes with Drouet to a
restaurant after the theater, Dreiser echoes Spencer's
notion that "moral differences" are produced by "habit."
If any habits had ever had time to fix upon her,
they would have operated here.
Habits are peculiar
things.
They will drive the really non-religious
mind out of bed to say prayers that are only a
custom and not a devotion.
The victim of habit,
when he has neglected the thing which was customary
with him to do, feels a little scratching in the
brain, a little irritating something which comes
of being out of the rut, and imagines it to be the
prick of conscience, the still, small voice that
is urging him ever to righteousness.
(SC, p. 77)
Having apparently reduced morals to a matter of habit
and custom, it would seem that Dreiser is making a nihilistic
attack on ethics as a whole.

His relatively neutral report

ing of Carrie's adultery and Hurstwood's thievery gives rise
to the view that Sister Carrie is an a-moral work.

But what

he has actually attempted is to explode conventional morality
and to supplant it with what he regards as a "true ethic."
The nature of the moral strain which Dreiser wishes to
expose is aptly pointed up by lines from "Under the
Gaslight," the play in which Carrie gains her first
theatrical experience.

Speaking of the character Carrie

portrays, one of the actors declaims,
Have you ever heard of the Siberian wolves? When
one of the pack falls through weakness, the others
devour him.
It is not an elegant comparison— but
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there is something wolfish in society.
Laura has
mocked it with a pretence, and society, which is
made up of pretences, will bitterly resent the
mockery.
(SC, p. 184)
When Carrie makes her entrance in the same scene of the play
". . . the social pack moved away from her scornfully."
(SC, p. 185)

It is, in Dreiser's view, a reversion to the

instinctive side of man's nature that leads us into the sort
of pack morality depicted in the play.
vated by this pack morality.

Hurstwood is moti

This is made clear when his

deliverations before stealing the money occasion this
reflection by the narrator:
We must remember that it may not be a knowledge of
right, for no knowledge of right is predicated of
the animal's instinctive recoil at evil.
Men are
still led by instincts before they are regulated
by knowledge.
It is instinct which recalls the
criminal— it is instinct, (where highly organized
reasoning is absent), which gives the criminal his
feeling of danger, his fear of wrong.
(SC,
p. 269)
Though Hurstwood vacillates for a long time before
taking the money, it is his drive for self-preservation
which deters him, not a real consideration of right and
wrong.
him.

"The true ethics of the situation never occurred to
It is most certain they never would have, under any

circumstances."

(SC, p. 270)

The "true ethics" of the

situation would never occur to Hurstwood because he has no
real ethic.

He has middle class morals but they are a

system of deceptions and lies, meeting the world,

like his

"home life," through "force of habit, by force of conven
tional opinion."

His morals arise out of what the equity
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theorists call "psychological equity."

Individuals naturally

attempt to reduce the distress of perceived inequity.

"A

person can restore psychological equity to a relationship by
distorting reality in appropriate ways.

He can try to

convince himself that an inequitable relationship is, in
fact, equitable."
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(SC, p. 87)

His bourgeois conscience

divorces itself from the many inequities about which it can
do nothing but suffer distress,
sional moral order.

setting up instead a delu

The only sin in this sort of moral

order is getting caught.

Hurstwood, therefore,

"lost

sympathy for the man that made a mistake and was found out."
(SC, p. 85)

He is as ready as the rest of the pack to fall

on the unfortunate wretch.

As Hurstwood discovers, however,

his w i f e fs pack instinct seems to be a little more highly
developed.

"Mrs. Hurstwood felt something, she knew not

what, sniffing change as animals do danger, afar off."
Hurstwood commits the cardinal error, dis found out, and his
wife, sensing her advantage,

sets upon him.

the confrontation with bestial imagery.

Dreiser salts

"Hurstwood pricked

up his ears . . . ," at the tone of his wife's voice.
tries to ignore it asking,
has there in the yard?"

He

"Where did George get that dog he

(SC, p. 219)

Later, sensing

instinctively her husband's final defeat, Mrs. Hurstwood
"turned upon him, animal-like, able to strike an effectual
second blow."

(SC, p. 220)

Shown in her final victory,

"She gazed at him— a pythoness in humor."

(SC, p. 221)

Thus, Dreiser shows middle class morality for the "pretence"
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he believes it to be.

In place of reasonable consideration

of the ethics of a given situation, there is a blind,
instinctive groping for either safety or advantage.
We will do well to recall, at this juncture, that
Dreiser opposes his notion of free will to instinct, and so
it is possible that by taking up the examination of free
will, we can illuminate the nature of what he considers
"true ethics."

Dreiser does not furnish a philosophical

aside explaining just what he meant by "free will," but he
does make clear that it is dependent upon and potentiated by
understanding.

In the narrative this is illustrated primar

ily by negative example.

Drouet, for instance, can be only

"as good as his intellect conceived."

(SC, p. 64)

Later he

is shown, in virtue of his ignorance, to be a fine proof of
a deterministic or fatalist model of the world:
That worthy had his future fixed
peradventure. He could not help
to do.
He could not see clearly
do differently.
He was drawn by
act the old pursuing part.
(SC,

for him beyond a
what he was going
enough to wish to
innate desire to
p. 75)

Hurstwood is trapped in his fate, much like Drouet, by lack
of capacity for understanding or analysis.

He is more

truthful than he suspects when he tells Carrie of his
desperate deception of her,
know what else to do."

"I was simply put where I didn't

(SC, p. 279)

his own chemistry because,

Hurstwood is doomed by

"Not trained to reason or intro

spect himself, he could not analyze the change that was
taking place in his mind and hence his body."
There is an alternative:

(SC, p. 339)
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It is the higher mental development which induces
philosophy and that fortitude which refuses to
dwell upon such things— refuses to be made to
suffer by their consideration.
(SC, p. 341)
Carrie, on the other hand, while no intellectual, tends to
be made more free by what powers of observation and analysis
she has.

Carrie, on the stage in New York, is very different

from the Carrie of Chicago who was reluctant to "recite
without solicitation.”

(SC, p. 171)

Her keener perception

of her relation to, and worth to the world, leads her to
"break part"

(as Drouet was said to be incapable of doing)

in a performance, to deviate from the role laid out for her.
He [the star] expected no answer and a dull one
would have been reproved.
But Carrie, whose
experience and belief in herself gave her daring,
courtsied sweetly again and answered:
"I am yours truly."

(SC, p. 431)

She has changed in other ways, too:
Experience of the world and of necessity was in
her favor.
No longer the lightest word of a man
made her head dizzy.
She had learned that
men
could change and fail.
Flattery in its most
palpable form had lost its force with her.
(SC,
p. 432)
Dreiser attempts in Sister Carrie a narrative resolution
of the paradox of a world where there is mechanistic causa
tion, fate, and there is also free will.

Deliberately, and

to some extent constrained by the nature of this under
taking, he fashioned a tragedy.

As Donald Pizer observes,

Dreiser himself called Sister Carrie the "tragedy of a man's
life."
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Sister Carrie is, in part anyway, Carrie's portrait

as dramatic artist.

Dreiser could hardly have written a
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novel so intrinsically concerned with the theater without
having been mindful of the dramatic archetypes in the story.
We have W. A. Swanberg's recounting of Dreiser's burst of
enthusiasm for Sophocles, in an instance where the tragedian
sounds precociously existentialist.
These two literary realists (Dreiser and Edgar Lee
Masters) saw each other almost every day, and
Floyd Dell, dropping in on them at Tenth Street,
found them reading Sophocles aloud:
"0 ye
deathward going tribes of men, what do yogg lives
mean except that they go to nothingness."
With this in mind, and given Larzer Ziff's suggestion
that "Spencer operated for Dreiser as a choric explanation
of experience," it is arguable that Dreiser's numerous
philosophical asides are similar to the Greek's choral
declamations,

serving the function of informing the audience

as to the nature of the higher forces with which the characters struggle.
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As m

Sophoclean tragedy, each of the

characters is given a fate in this novel, and each is given
a sort of limited free will to either accept or attempt to
circumvent his fate.

Their autonomy is much like that of

their classical counterparts, as abstracted by J. C.
Opstetelten:

"(Fate's) operation, on the one hand, coincides

with the deployment of devine power, and, on the other hand,
operates actively not so much over against man as out of
him, as an immanent force belonging to man's ultimate
being.

. . .

That is why Sophocles' heroes appear at once

to act freely and to fulfil their destiny.

..."

Interest

ingly, Hurstwood resembles the Sophoclean hero in more than
his conditioned freedom, for as Opstelten goes on to observe
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of the Greek's typical protagonist, often,
rehabilitation is a self-chosen death."
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"His only
To a certain

extent, one's struggle against fate hastens one's dissolu
tion.

But as Pizer aptly argues, Dreiser's adaptation of

tragedy is not strictly classical in form.

Hurstwood's fall

is not the product of a single transgression, the hamartia,
or sin, of Sophocles and Aristotle.
Hurstwood's fall is not primarily a tragedy of
chance, of the accidental closing of the safe.
It
is principally the tragedy of a man who thinks he
is impregnable but who is then discovered to be
weak when his 2desires drive him outside protection
of his roles.
Hurstwood's tragedy is partly that of the modern "everyman,"
a "medieval tragedy," a "fall from high places as the
universal forces of 'circumstance' and 'subconscious direction' have their day."

26

Hurstwood only hastens his undoing with his crime, that
being only a part of his larger tendency to test "the
boundaries which necessity sets."

(SC, p. 132)

Hurstwood

steals the money because he takes typical "bad faith" view
of money, seeing it as "usurped privilege."

(SC, p. 62)

The money represents to Hurstwood a usurpation of dominance?
his theft is an attempt to escape the social order.

Dreiser

describes Hurstwood's deluded presumption in terms reminis
cent of the classical, anthropomorphizing world view:
A prisoner of fate, held enchained for his own
delight, he does not know that the walls are tall,
that the sentinels of life are forever pacing,
musket in hand.
He cannot perceive that all joy
is within and not without.
He must be for scaling
the bounds of society, for overpowering the
sentinel.
(SC, p. 132)
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Hurstwood's presumption is a violation of the social order
as conceived by Spencer and enforced by equilibration.

For

Spencer, ideally, no desires are entertained but those which
may be "properly" enacted within the context of society.
Thus, his hypothetical universal equilibrium will be, "the
arrival at a state of human nature and social organization,
such that the individual has no desires but those which may
be satisfied without exceeding the proper sphere of
action.

. . ."
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Hurstwood's failure, m

Spencerian terms,

is a failure of "equilibration between man's desires and the
conduct necessitated by surrounding conditions."
p. 443)

(FP,

Hurstwood's transgressions, like those of Carrie

and Drouet, do not necessitate swift retribution.

Dreiser

depicts instead a slow and subtle evolution of Hurstwood's
"surrounding conditions," a change which renders them
hostile to the saloonkeeper, as he himself grows less
adaptable.
The proper exercise of free will, as opposed to
Hurstwood's, is "philosophic" resignation,

"alignment with

the forces" which govern the universe, something akin to
acceptance of the will of the gods.

Ames is the only

character in the novel to achieve this resignation.

He is,

in his denigration of material pretence, akin to ". . . the
Epictitus who smiles when the last vestige of physical
welfare has been removed."

(SC, p. 340)

Ames, at Sherry's,

shows disdain for the "usurped privilege" of the nouveau
riche:
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I sometimes think it's a shame for people to
spend so much money this way. . . . They pay so
much more than these things are worth.
They put
on so much show.
(SC, p. 334)
Ames is so far from the sort of self-destructive brooding
that Hurstwood engages in, over "constant comparison of his
old state and his new," that he takes Carrie away from her
own materialistic dissatisfactions.
He had taken away some of the bitterness of the
contrast between this life and her life, all by a
certain defiant indifference which concerned only
him.
(SC, p. 336)
Ames' superiority consists partly in his "indifference" to
the tides of materialism.

Manifest elsewhere, less perfectly

in the less perfect creatures of the material world, even
the appearance of indifference can be a distinguishing
feature of superiority.

Hurstwood, before his precipitous

decline, is still capable of presenting a detached appear
ance to the world,

for while,

"Drouet was palavering with

the loosesness of excitement and passion.

The manager

mastered himself only by a superhuman effort."

(SC, p. 193)

Mrs. Hurstwood vanquishes her husband in their confrontation
partly in virtue of her unprecedented "cruel look of indif
ference."

(SC, p. 220)

After her dinner with the Vances

and Ames, Carrie aspires to Ames' calm, taking her leave
with "feigned indifference."

(SC, p. 337)

The quality of indifference, such as Ames manifests,
seems to be the saving grace in the tragic world of Sister
Carrie.

It is to be distinguished from the indifference of

apathy and torpor into which Hurstwood sinks in New York.
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It is a product of the process of resignation,
form, of philosophical resignation.

in its purest

(In Ames' case the

quality resembles what Kierkegaard spoke of as "infinite
resignation.") 2 8

In almost all cases a certain passivity

seems to bring one into more fortuitous
forces.'

'alignment with the

Thus, Carrie, with her "passivity of soul," is the

one smiled upon by the gods.

(SC/ P- 157)

Thus too, Ames

advocates self-abnegation as the highest calling.

The

electrical expert speaks in terms reminiscent of conduction
versus resistance,

"You and I are but mediums through which

something is expressing itself.
ourselves ready mediums."

Now, our duty is to make

(SC, p. 485)

The "something"

which expresses itself, is the same power which Opstelten
sees coming "out of" man, the "immanent force belonging to
man's ultimate being."
Dreiser, through Ames, confronts us directly with a
curious form of freedom, one which incorporates both compul
sion (by that which "expresses something")
recognize or ignore one's "duty."

and choice, to

Under Spencer's model, as

his concepts appear in this novel, free will and fate or
determinism are just two more of the opposites or correla
tives through which we must envision the world.

In Sister

Carrie we never see absolute freedom or absolute determinism,
the characters are free in proportion to their understanding
of their situation and the forces being brought to bear upon
them.

Absolute freedom and absolute compulsion lose meaning

in this context,

just as it is meaningless to say, for
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instance, that anything is absolutely expensive or absolutely
cheap.

(Dreiser would not admit to anything being, in the

economic sense,

"free.")

One can be only more or less free.

As Dreiser portrays it, freedom sounds very much like the
freedom of Merleau-Ponty's succinct analysis:
What then is freedom? To be born is to be
born of the world and to be born into the world.
The world is already constituted, but also never
completely constituted; in the first case we are
acted upon, in the second we are open to an
infinite number of possibilities.
But this
analysis is still abstract, for we exist in both
ways at o n c e . There is, therefore, never
determinism and never absolute choice. . . . The
generality of the "role" and of the situation
comes to the aid of decision, and in this exchange
between the situation and the person who takes it
up, it is impossible to determine precisely the
"share contributed by the situation" and the
"share contributed by freedom."
Dreiser seems to feel too that we are "open to an
infinite number of possibilities"? man for him is "a creature
of incalculable variability."

(SC, p. 73)

The world, as

Merleau-Ponty says, "is never completely constituted, just
as, for Dreiser,

"evolution is ever in action."

(SC, p. 7 3)

The fact that man is not independent of "the forces which
sweep and play throughout the universe"

(SC, p. 73) leaves

him, for both Dreiser and Merleau-Ponty, vacillating between
freedom and compulsion.

The fact of determinism, that there

is causation, that the forces of the universe shape and
sometimes govern human behavior, does not explode, for
Dreiser, all morality.

He is not speaking metaphorically

when he speaks of morals and ethics.

Early in Sister

Carrie, Dreiser waves some philosophical expostulations into
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the narrative, and these point the way to a morality within
the framework of causation and mechanistic philosophy:
Answer first, why the heart thrills:
explain
wherefore some plaintive note goes wandering about
the world undying, make clear the rose's subtle
alchemy, evolving its ruddy lamp in light and
rain.
In the essence of these facts lie the first
principles of morals.
"Oh," thought Drouet,
conquest."

"how delicious is my

"Ah," thought Carrie with mournful misgivings,
"what is it I have lost?"
Before this world-old proposition we stand,
serious, interested, confused; endeavouring to
evolve the true theory of morals— the true answer
to what is right.
(SC, p. 88)
This is not simply rhetoric, Sister Carrie constitutes
Dreiser's "endeavour to evolve" a theory of morals,

for in

these simple reflections of Carrie and Drouet is a clue to
the nature of morality.

The salient point of their respec

tive positions is this:

Drouet's boon necessitates Carrie's

loss.-

Nothing can be gained on the one hand without a

correlative loss on the other, and this is a principle
derived from nature itself, like the "rose's alchemy."
gain and loss is simply equilibration.
crux of the novel.

All

This forms the moral

Hurstwood errs under the terms of the

novel's ethic because he believes he can separate gain and
loss, action and reaction.

He is one of those without

"Conception of a well-organized society wherein all shall
accept a certain quota of responsibility and all realize a
certain amount of happiness."

(SC, p. 132)

his liaison with Carrie, with " . . .

He enters into

only a thought of
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pleasure without responsibility.

...

He would be happy

with her and his own affairs would go on undisturbed."
p. 133)

He is like Joyce's "sentimentalist," " . . .

(SC,

who

would enjoy without incurring the immense debtorship for a
thing done."
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He is more literally correct, once again,

than he knows when he tells Carrie,
waste a little affection on me."

". . . 1

need someone to

(SC, p. 128)

"Waste" is

the correct word because he feels no corresponding
responsibility or obligation incurred by the privilege of
intimacy.

Ames is the only character of the novel to grasp

the underlying ethical principle of their world and he
presents us with a sort of moral summary in the form of his
advice to Carrie.

The advice he gives has both ethical and

aesthetic significance, but, most important, it shows the
relation of Carrie's self-interest to her moral obligation:
It so happens that you have the power to act.
That is no credit to you.
You might not have had
it.
It isn't an excuse for pride or self glori
fication.
You paid nothing to get it.
But now
that you have it you must do something with
it . . . .
You have so much sympathy and such a melodious
voice— make them valuable to others.
You will
have them so long as they express something in
you. . . . You can't become self-interested,
selfish and luxurious without having these
sympathies and longings disappear. . . . You
can't remain tender and sympathetic, and desire to
serve the world without having it show in your
face and your art.
(SC, p. 486)
By themselves, Ames' assertions do not seem necessarily
to follow, but in light of the novel's metaphysics they
prove to be logical.

Dreiser has asserted that money, in

its true analysis, proves to be "stored energy."

(SC,
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p. 62)

As such, it simply cannot be created ex nihilo.

Carrie paid nothing to get her talent, but still it seems to
mint money out of the air.

Money must conform, like all

other forces in the world, to the principle of equilibration;
therefore, the books must balance.

Carrie has incurred a

debt, her own equilibrium is therefore unstable.

In a state

of equilibrium the balance "habitually receives from its
environment as much as it habitually loses.
p. 448)

..."

(FP,

When it ceases to, as in Hurstwood's case, dissolu

tion sets in immediately.

The world sees to it subtly that

it does not give more than it habitually receives.

Carrie

gets nothing for nothing? her satisfaction with wealth
shrinks as fast as wealth grows.
It does not take money long to make plain its
impotence providing the desires are in the realm
of affection.
With her one hundred fifty dollars
in hand Carrie could think of nothing particularly
to do. . . . If she wanted to do anything better
or move higher, she must have more— a great deal
more.
(S£, p. 457)
Thus, Ames' advice amounts to a call for Carrie to seek
artistic and selfless satisfactions, rather than material
satisfaction.

Artistic satisfaction would consist partly in

benefit to others and would presumably require a higher
effort of Carrie.

It would serve then to balance Carrie's

debt, eliminate the debt's "drag on her soul."

(SC, p. 477)

It would allow her to make an act of restitution, restoring
as the social scientists have it, "actual equity," without
resorting to the delusional systems required by psychological
equity seeking, delusions which would threaten the "sympathy"
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Ames sees as necessary to her art.

(SC, p. 477)

balance would then be restored to her life.

The

She would

receive, in satisfaction, as much from her environment as
she lost, and dissolution would be forestalled.

So, Ames

(and Spencer) have clearly pointed the way for Carrie, but
Dreiser leaves it unresolved at the novel's end whether she
will follow it, or fall victim to her material success.
Clearly, Dreiser has woven a moral principle into
Sister Carrie finding in equilibration a balance on which
the true ethical considerations of the story may be weighed.
He proposes an ethic which eschews the particular proscrip
tion (Thou shalt not commit adultery,

for instance) and

calls for recognition of a generalizable principle:

respon

sibility follows on privilege and gain, just as reaction
follows action.

Having started with the most abstract of

physical principles, he constructed a work in which that
principle shaped, consistently, the language,

structure and

plot, and in so doing instanced an ethical principle operant
within, even necessitated by, the principles of a mechanistic
model of the world.
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